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Q : Britain and France have great responsibility to ex colonial countries. How much responsibility do Britain and France have to solve any problems within those countries without the aid of NATO or other security groups?
A : I think the question is not accurately set out. Responsibility and solidarity to less developed countries are a duty at all rich countries and are not linked either to a colonial past or to a former exploitation of their human and natural resources. This is an ethical and political requirement. In Kosovo, Great Britain and France, together with the Allies, have demonstrated that they considered themselves responsible for the protection of any people's right to live peacefully, whatever the country's status might be. However, it is true we feel more involved when the countries are close to us due to their location or history. In this case, we develop close bilateral relations, programmes of co-operation, and if possible, a trustful political co-operation. Intervening with armed forces is an exceptional hypothesis and can only be considered in a multilateral framework under the control of the UNO.
Q : France has signed up both ESDI and NATO, in a world of limited resources. How is France going to juggle with the long-term commitment to the two institutions?
A : First this does not apply to France alone to the eleven European countries who are also members of the European Union and the Alliance, thus committed both to the Alliance and the Europe of Defence.
We do not have to juggle since the two commitments are absolutely compatible. A European autonomous capacity is not excluded from the Alliance. Staff and equipment which will be profitable to the European defence will also benefit to the Atlantic Alliance, and vice versa. When the 15 members of the European Union are able to deploy 60 000 men during one year, when they develop their command, information and projection capacities, these tools can be mobilised for the Alliance.
For instance, since April 18th, the European Corps supplies the core staff of the KFOR in Kosovo. It is the same effort towards rationalisation, adaptation and interoperability which is made within the European Union and within the context of the Defence conventional initiative (DCI) of the Alliance.
Q : Did France have a different relationship with former Yugoslavia than other NATO countries? What lessons did France learn that were different to other nations?
A : The so-called " different relations " between France and former Yugoslavia are a tale. Only facts matter: we were the first European contributors to the air campaign, especially regarding the number of strikes on Yugoslavian targets, and we are the second contributors to the ground operation. About the lessons we learnt from the operations, you noticed that we made them public, as Great Britain and the US did. We agree on the key points: we all realised that an effort on our equipment is necessary, and NATO confirmed it was able to deal with that kind of conflict, even if some aspects still must be improved. However, we got the confirmation of one concept that was specific to us: our status within NATO, outside the integrated military organisation, is not an obstacle for us to be a first rank ally nor to put forward our views within the decision making system of the Alliance.
Q : You stated that during the French presidency of the European Union that defence would become more of a European priority. What plans do you have to develop this and what other parameters are there that effect European defence policy?
A : I did not make that statement and I do not think France should claim a special role in this important and lasting project depending on the political will of the 15 European nations. What we are now starting up is the fruit of a methodical work carried out by the 15 countries. In Helsinki, the 15 head of state and governments did decide to set ambitious objectives and I hope they will set some definite tasks in Feira for a new step of the Europe of defence during the French presidency. But this will be a step, followed by others in order to make some progress. We will carry on the work undertaken by the Portuguese presidency and will implement the plan decided in Helsinki concerning both political and military decision making bodies and capacities. On that matter, we would like to make possible for each country to indicate its own contribution to the comprehensive target and to the collective objectives concerning capacities. We will then have covered a long distance and so Europe will be given a new tool for its political responsibility in the lasting, fair settlement of conflicts and for its peace ideal.
(Source http://www.défense.gouv.fr, le 15 mai 2000)
A : I think the question is not accurately set out. Responsibility and solidarity to less developed countries are a duty at all rich countries and are not linked either to a colonial past or to a former exploitation of their human and natural resources. This is an ethical and political requirement. In Kosovo, Great Britain and France, together with the Allies, have demonstrated that they considered themselves responsible for the protection of any people's right to live peacefully, whatever the country's status might be. However, it is true we feel more involved when the countries are close to us due to their location or history. In this case, we develop close bilateral relations, programmes of co-operation, and if possible, a trustful political co-operation. Intervening with armed forces is an exceptional hypothesis and can only be considered in a multilateral framework under the control of the UNO.
Q : France has signed up both ESDI and NATO, in a world of limited resources. How is France going to juggle with the long-term commitment to the two institutions?
A : First this does not apply to France alone to the eleven European countries who are also members of the European Union and the Alliance, thus committed both to the Alliance and the Europe of Defence.
We do not have to juggle since the two commitments are absolutely compatible. A European autonomous capacity is not excluded from the Alliance. Staff and equipment which will be profitable to the European defence will also benefit to the Atlantic Alliance, and vice versa. When the 15 members of the European Union are able to deploy 60 000 men during one year, when they develop their command, information and projection capacities, these tools can be mobilised for the Alliance.
For instance, since April 18th, the European Corps supplies the core staff of the KFOR in Kosovo. It is the same effort towards rationalisation, adaptation and interoperability which is made within the European Union and within the context of the Defence conventional initiative (DCI) of the Alliance.
Q : Did France have a different relationship with former Yugoslavia than other NATO countries? What lessons did France learn that were different to other nations?
A : The so-called " different relations " between France and former Yugoslavia are a tale. Only facts matter: we were the first European contributors to the air campaign, especially regarding the number of strikes on Yugoslavian targets, and we are the second contributors to the ground operation. About the lessons we learnt from the operations, you noticed that we made them public, as Great Britain and the US did. We agree on the key points: we all realised that an effort on our equipment is necessary, and NATO confirmed it was able to deal with that kind of conflict, even if some aspects still must be improved. However, we got the confirmation of one concept that was specific to us: our status within NATO, outside the integrated military organisation, is not an obstacle for us to be a first rank ally nor to put forward our views within the decision making system of the Alliance.
Q : You stated that during the French presidency of the European Union that defence would become more of a European priority. What plans do you have to develop this and what other parameters are there that effect European defence policy?
A : I did not make that statement and I do not think France should claim a special role in this important and lasting project depending on the political will of the 15 European nations. What we are now starting up is the fruit of a methodical work carried out by the 15 countries. In Helsinki, the 15 head of state and governments did decide to set ambitious objectives and I hope they will set some definite tasks in Feira for a new step of the Europe of defence during the French presidency. But this will be a step, followed by others in order to make some progress. We will carry on the work undertaken by the Portuguese presidency and will implement the plan decided in Helsinki concerning both political and military decision making bodies and capacities. On that matter, we would like to make possible for each country to indicate its own contribution to the comprehensive target and to the collective objectives concerning capacities. We will then have covered a long distance and so Europe will be given a new tool for its political responsibility in the lasting, fair settlement of conflicts and for its peace ideal.
(Source http://www.défense.gouv.fr, le 15 mai 2000)