Texte intégral
When building the new house of Europe, the heart and mind should be equal partners
Before the collapse of communism, Europeans defined the European house as “the fruit of geography, history and necessity,” a description first given by the late French President François Mitterrand. By this, he meant that geography had mapped out this group of nations at the western edge of the larger Eurasian continent and that history – in the form of the Treaty of Yalta – had limited European union by dividing Europe in half. Necessity played a crucial role among the nations ruined by World War II and menaced by Soviet expansion through their determination to prevent such devastating conflict from ever threatening Europe again. European hearts and minds have been united in this cause since the European Congress at the Hague convened 50 years ago under Winston Churchill to bring together representatives from every country to solemnly swear: “We will never war among ourselves again.” Participants at the European Congress recognized the necessity of rebuilding their nations – economically and politically – within the framework of close mutual cooperation. Mindful of the heart, they also added cultural projects under the impetus of Denis de Rougemont.
But this harmony of heart and mind was hardly going to with stand the profound differences between countries concerning the construction of the European Community's future political and institutional framework. Take, for example, the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 or the quarrels – still a long way from being resolved – between those who wish to see a federal Europe and those who prefer a looser grouping of sovereign states.
This brief historical sketch explains why the construction of the European house hasn't been a smooth and tranquil process. The path chosen was the one least strewn with pitfalls, that of economic integration in three main stages: the common market treaty of 1957, the development of political accords to spur the growth of the common market, and the economic revival of 1985-88 which, in turn, demanded that institutions adapt themselves in a federalist style and that political agreements be developed. This process has led to Economic and Monetary Union and the launch of the single currency.
But since the 1960s, the heirs to the fathers of the European community have wondered what will become of political Europe, the Europe of shared social and foreign policies. In this regard, there have been many difficult discussions with those who, whether through tradition or economic interest, want an exclusively economic unification of Europe through the creation of a vast free market trading zone in line with the realities of globalization. This is the principal reason for the operational weakness of parts of the Maastricht – and more recently, the Amsterdam – Treaties which deal with common foreign and defense policies and the reform of E.U. institutions. These institutions were originally designed for six countries and are increasingly ill-suited to a 15-member Union, much less to a possible 30-member Union in the near future.
The effort to construct the European house has therefore reached a crossroads. The heart, and part of the mind, compel us to regard the extension of the E.U. to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as a priority, an absolute duty. No one openly contests this. But without thorough reflection on our political aims, this union of 30 states will be no more than a large single market based on the free movement of goods, services, capital and, perhaps at some later stage, people. And where people are concerned, we should not underestimate the explosive problems linked to immigration and new kinds of organized crime that respect no borders. A purely economic European house – subject as it would be to the caprices of history, the markets and often conflicting national interests – would be a triumph of short-sightedness. This vision of Europe's political future, which some may regard as too pessimistic, has been contrasted with the success of the gradual gearing up for closer integration that has worked well enough up until now. Proponents of this approach have great hopes for the single currency, one of the pillars of sovereignty, which those who have joined it from the start regard as a giant step toward closer political unity.
This is where the heart reasserts itself, emphasizing that neither a laissez-faire economic approach nor the powerful European Central Bank are enough, by themselves, to strengthen the ties that already bind the 11 countries (perhaps soon 15) now participating in the single currency. These links are forged of a shared idea of the Europe that is now coming into being, an idea based on three indivisible elements: competition to stimulate the economy, cooperation to strengthen the E.U., and solidarity to unite the peoples of Europe. ln addition to the cultural and human exchanges that have already developed within the E.U., these are the roots that nourish the Europe of the heart.
To listen to the reaction of member countries to the propositions of the European Commission's Agenda 2000 – which deals with the E.U.’s agricultural, regional development and social policies – one could legitimately be concerned about the fate of future cooperation and solidarity. I know, from my experience as President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, that this is not the first time we have come across such tensions. Die-hard optimists will tell you that each important meeting was preceded by
warnings and temporary logjams. This was certainly the case with my proposals, made in 1987, designed to augment community resources and foster important developments – such as regional aid and budget reform – in E.U. politics. When agreement was finally reached on these proposals in 1988, however, it was in a climate of genuine family spirit. The heart, and a shared sense of history, were able to transcend differences of national interest and understanding. Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, because they were imbued with this shared vision, were able to make enormous contributions to the realization of these plans.
Things were different in 1993 when I proposed, on behalf of the European Commission, a White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, a document that drew attention to the delay of European countries in adapting to new challenges presented by technological and demographic shifts and globalization. While a number of countries successfully adopted these proposed adjustments in their domestic policies, the European dimension was completely overlooked. The reason I mention this is that not all Europeans, it seems, feel that Europe is menaced by a form of geopolitical and economic decline, and what is more, that this situation does not strike them as inevitable. But to respond effectively to challenges that transcend national borders, it is necessary to combine national efforts with a reinforced cooperation among states at the European level: cooperation in macroeconomic policies to ensure the success of EMU, cooperation on research between public policymakers and private enterprise, and cooperation to achieve a sustainable development that is more respectful of the environment and that guarantees equality between nations and fundamental human needs.
But strengthening cooperation doesn't mean transferring more power to the European level. It’s a more basic question of clarifying jurisdictions, choosing the right level at which decisions should be made by applying the principles of subsidiarity and decentralization and reinforcing democratic accountability. Is this vision a realistic one for a European Union made up of some 30-member states? If so, what kind of institutions, democratic controls and forms of openness are needed to allow citizens to understand what is at stake, to fully participate in and reinforce the common feeling of being part of a great adventure? If these questions are not properly addressed – and if Europeans are not engaged in a full and democratic debate about their future – we risk neglecting both the heart and the mind; we risk missing out on a clear perception of the challenges of history and on the duty of all Europeans, in harmony with their own best interests, to also keep the best interests of Europe at heart.