Texte intégral
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is a pleasure to take the floor in front of such a distinguished panel of defense and European security experts.
Let me begin with a few words on the Kosovo crisis. This was a defining moment for the Balkans, for European security, and for the Atlantic Alliance. We were able, once again, to demonstrate that we were prepared to act together for the defense of common interests and common values. The partnership that we forged earlier in this century to fight against barbarity was confirmed and renewed through this trial. The tragedy of the Southern Balkans, and the immense human suffering in this region, was, and still is, a reminder of the goals that we share. It helps us to keep in perspective the more bureaucratic aspects of defense policies and our secondary occasional disagreements. We sometimes differ on strategies and methods - not on goals and values.
I will not dwell on the " good news, bad news " list of lessons learned for the Alliance, as I imagine that you are all too familiar with it by now. Let me simply say once again that however demanding this crisis was for the Alliance, we were able to maintain a high degree of unity and cohesion in defending our common interests. I would like to commend here, once again, the direct military involvement of the US and of our allies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain or the Netherlands, but also the courageous and firm commitment of countries closer to the theater of operations, such as Italy, Greece or Hungary. These are very positive developments both for the future of the Alliance and for the future of European defense.
The management of the Kosovo crisis was also a rewarding example of cooperation and synergies between various fora and institutions: it was only natural for this common military operation to be undertaken in a NATO framework; but the political management was achieved by the Group of Contact, the European Union, the G8 and the ultimate legitimacy conferred by the United Nations.
For France, there were reasons to be satisfied. Our involvement validated the principles of our new defense model: total professionalization, emphasis on intelligence, command and control, and projection capacities.
Our current shortcomings were verified: suppression of enemy air defenses, all-weather precision strike, airlift, battlefield damage assessment; our defense planning already takes into account most of these (for example, cruise missiles are already included in our procurement plan).
French participation in Allied Force was, as you know, quite significant. No other country, apart from the United States, was able to deploy so wide a range of Air Force, Navy and Army military means, notably in areas where few NATO members have any useful capacities, such as intelligence-gathering tools or Search Rescue capabilities. France deployed 68 combat aircraft (7% of the coalition total), including 51 strike aircraft (8.8%). The total number of sorties of French aircraft put us second only to the United States, and makes our air contribution by and large the first European one. In particular, French aircraft flew 16.6% of all close air support sorties, 13.8% of all reconnaissance sorties, 11.2% of all electronic intelligence sorties. France was the only European country to deploy a conventional aircraft carrier on the theater. Our commitment to the NATO management of the Kosovo crisis also included significant ground forces, from XFOR (headed by a French officer) to KFOR.
I understand that several of the lessons we have drawn from the Kosovo crisis are shared by many in the United States. In particular, the importance of the communication dimension was underestimated by many of us. NATO was not prepared enough for this.
I should also emphasize that many of the "lessons" cannot yet be "learned ". Forgive me for stating the obvious: this is an ongoing operation, of which we have " won " - for whatever that means - the first" round ". But we have yet to " win " the second round. We have yet to win the peace. UNMIK and KFOR, a NATO force that includes mostly (80%) European personnel and which will soon be commanded by a European military structure, will need our full political support in the months to come.
We will have other crises to manage together, other common operations to conduct. We will sometimes have disagreements. Major peace enforcement operations are among the most difficult ones to manage. During the Kosovo crisis, all of our governments had to face domestic political pressures, in one way or another. We had to work hard to reach consensus in the North Atlantic Council. But a tight political control by all NATO allies is necessary when the use of force is about imposing military pressure and not about waging total war.
*
The European military effort is frequently misunderstood in this country. Let me try to set the record straight.
a. The "deployability gap"
It is true that even the ratio between the total number of military personnel in Europe and the total number of deployable forces for a crisis management operation is not satisfying. This is one of the reasons behind our common effort launched at Helsinki. But one should be cautious about crude comparisons:
* Geography makes a difference. US forces are bound to have a very high level of deployability because they are far away from most of their possible theaters. Europe is planning to act mainly in its surroundings.
* Engagements matter too. The US is a global power with global military engagements. Europe has global economic and political responsibilities, but does not claim to have the same scope and level of military engagements around the world.
* The Cold war has ended but NATO has not forfeited the need for collective defense. Some European countries believe that they should maintain significant main defense forces for possible regional operations in their near neighborhood.
* Some progress in deployability has already been achieved since the end of the Cold War. A September 1999 study of European armed forces by the US General Accounting Office, mandated by the US Congress, found that " NATO allies have become more mobile and deployable as envisioned by the [Rome 1991] Strategic Concept (...). Each of the 13 allied countries we studied have achieved greater mobility and deployability ". France is of course in its way to be highly deployable by 2002, when our overall reorganization will be over.
b) The " spending gap "
* The US effort is now on the rise, but this is happening after 10 years of sharp decline and eight years of sustained economic growth. As you know, the US budget [in $1997] was 400 billion $ in 1985 and was reduced to 250 billion dollars in 1997. The US defense investment account (R D plus procurement) has fallen by 60% since 1990. It was [in $1997] about 120 billion dollars in 1985, and is now about 50 billion dollars.
* The European effort is insufficient, but the gap between European spending and US spending is actually decreasing, not increasing: the combined spending of the 11 EU and NATO members was 58% of that of the US in 1992; it is now 65% by NATO data. This reveals the fact that the European defense budgets have been more efficiently sheltered from the so-called " peace dividends effect " than the US one. And Europe is now entering a durable growth period, which should, as has been the case in the US, sustain a resumption of defense expenditure.
c) The " technological gap "
* Technology is not the only measure of an effective defense effort. There is often, in this country, what some here could call a "technology-biased " approach of defense. But human capabilities are also critical. In peace operations, in particular, human abilities and know-how are as important, if not more, than, technologies.
* The exceptional economic and technological dynamism of the United States, allows it to develop, introduce and deploy, faster than any other country, high-tech military means. This makes the definition and implementation of NATO standards and of interoperability norms by all 19 nations sometimes difficult.
* The reality of the gap should not be exaggerated. We often confuse, the increasing gap between the civilian technologies and the military technologies in all our countries; and the gap between actual military equipment in Europe and in the US, which is more limited.
* In many respects, we can live with it. There was no critical interoperability deficiency in Operation Allied Force, even if the situation in the field of communications was not satisfactory.
* Indeed, despite our shortcomings, the gap often concerns capacities more than technologies. Europe critically lacks modern and robust intelligence capacities, for instance, including space-based ones. It also lacks heavy lift capacities, which are not at the frontier of technological conquest.
* Examples in the civilian sector (aerospace, communications) show us that Europe is not always lagging behind - and that, when it does, it is able to " catch up ". Indeed, Airbus and Arianespace have strong transatlantic ties at a cutting-edge level of technology.
So we need to spend no less, and perhaps more, especially on R D at the European level. But we mostly need to spend better. We want to have better value for our money - " more defense for our Euros ".
*
The fragmentation of the European defense effort has long been a source of frustration on both sides of the Atlantic, both on the industrial and on the policy side. It is our belief that the best approach to overcome this starts with consolidation among Europeans, to have more effective transatlantic cooperation.
Indeed, there is now progress being made.
* In the industrial domain, restructurings and mergers are now well underway. New, unified regulatory frameworks that allow for increased international cooperation are also needed. The " Letter of Intent " (LoI) framework, which involves the six EU members where 90% of the defense industry of the Union is located, is a first step in this direction; it is now finalized and should be signed shortly. It will allow for transparency of borders and increased industrial efficiency (sensitive information transfers, export controls, and security of acquisitions). It will then be possible to move ahead as far as transatlantic cooperation is concerned. Further efforts will be necessary on both sides of the Atlantic to reach consensus on the real equality of access through both markets. We welcome, in this respect, the recent US/UK Declaration on industrial cooperation, which is consistent and compatible with this European effort.
* The remarkable acceleration of the progress in the defense dimension of " Project Europe " has been brought by a combination of several factors. The preservation and the solidity of our common Alliance is he first of them: NATO continues to be the bedrock of security on the Euro-Atlantic region. The achievement of European Monetary Union, something that many in this town were very skeptical about only two years ago was another one, which showed a successful challenge and allowed us to transfer some of our energies to a new field. The fact that all of our key European partners now fully concur with the idea of giving the EU a defense dimension was also critical. And finally, the Kosovo crisis, that acted both as a wake-up call and as a booster.
Helsinki will allow for military operations in situations where, for a reason or another, the US is not willing to use force on its own. Our common language reads as follows: " the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capability to take decisions, and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then conduct EU-led military operations in response to an international crisis ".
This does not imply a relaxation of transatlantic links. Quite the contrary. As my German colleague Rudolf Scharping recently said at the Wehrkunde conference: "Generating a European security and defense identity by strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, and developing the political and structural prerequisites for a European security and defense policy as part of European integration, are two sides of the same coin".
In addition, the " institutions " that we are creating will be of a reasonable size when compared with their NATO equivalents: the European Military Staff will comprise between 60 and 90 officers, and will thus be roughly five times smaller than NATO's International Military Staff [383].
By 2003, we should be able to deploy in 60 days a corps-size ground force of up to 15 brigades (a total of 50-60,000 men) and sustain it over a year, with autonomous C3I and logistics. Helsinki also requires collective capabilities in the fields of strategic assessment, command and control, and strategic transport. A major effort at " pooling " some of our national capabilities is thus going to be necessary in the months and years to come. Such a capability may appear to you as a modest step: but its scope is adapted to most of the needs of crisis mastering by European forces. Command structures at the strategic level, and operational planning capabilities, will draw both on national and NATO assets. Focusing on this practical achievements is for us a realistic way of supporting our Alliance as well as of developing the European ability to pacify its environment.
*
Some of you here are familiar with the French defense planning process. You know that the current Six-Year Defense Plan adopted by our Parliament in 1996 - what we call the Military Program Law - is the decisive one on the road towards our new Defense Model.
Having just passed the first half of this plan we can see the benefits of the major restructuring efforts that have been undertaken since 1991. As you know, we had serious shortcomings at the time of the Gulf War. Our projection capacity for crisis management was very limited and we had to "improvise" a lot. Now our projection capacity is of about 15.000 Army personnel for a deployment of unlimited duration, and of about 30.000 Army personnel for a year in extreme circumstances where all of our available capacities would be needed.
The next Military Program Law will bring these totals closer to the goals of the Defense Model: 50.000 Army personnel for NATO regional defense, or, simultaneously (for two concurrent deployments), 30.000 during one year for a major regional contingency, and 5.000 for a long-term deployment elsewhere. For their part, our Navy and Air Force are already, for all practical purposes, at the levels required by the Defense Model: a hundred combat aircraft with air refueling capacities and deployable air bases for the Air Force, a carrier battle group, nuclear attack submarines and amphibious forces for the Navy.
We have confirmed our intention to keep a high level of annual military spending. This effort amounts to about 30 billion euros a year (equivalent to 30 billion dollars), and has been constant since 1997.
I should add that the French defense effort has historically been one of the most consistent and coherent of all NATO countries:
* Our defense spending has not varied a lot over the years. It was [in converted FRF 1990] :
30.4 billion euros in 1980
33.8 billion euros in 1985
35.5 billion euros in 1990
32.9 billion euros in 1995
32.3 billion euros in 1999
By comparison, the US spending has been something of a roller-coaster:
224 billion dollars in 1980
301 billion dollars in 1985
306 billion dollars in 1990
240 billion dollars in 1995
225 billion dollars in 1999
* Our defense budget represented 11.4% of the US one in 1990, 13.3% in 1999. [Our equipment budget has been reduced; but the US one has been reduced much more.]
* We also maintain the highest defense spending to GDP ratio in NATO Europe (with the exception of Greece and Turkey, which are in a different situation): 2.8% in 1999, a figure that does not compare too badly to the US ratio (3.1%). I note that this ratio has diminished much more in the US than it has in France since the end of the Cold war [Fr : from 3.8% to 2.8% ; US : from 6% to about 3%].
* Our defense expenditure per capita ranks second in Europe [behind Norway]: 654 $ per capita.
I listen and read about US defense policy and I notice that the military establishments of our two countries face some analogue challenges :
* adjusting major equipment programs that were conceived or launched at the end of the Cold War ;
* facing multiple and concurrent military engagements, which stretch our armed forces to the limits of their possibilities and sometimes drain our planned procurement resources [a total of 37.600 French military personnel are currently deployed outside French metropolitan territory, including about 10.000 in ongoing military operations]
* stopping the decrease in national R D efforts [The Aerospace Industries Association says that the adjusted DoD RDT E effort in 2001 will be the lowest in 18 years].
The Prime minister has announced last fall that the Government will submit to Parliament the next Military Program Law in 2001. My office and the services have begun the preparatory work that will lead to the elaboration of this draft law. Some of the key issues that need to be addressed in this effort include:
* an adequate introduction of available technologies bringing greater efficiency and lowering costs,
* the lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis,
* the weight of long-term deployments on our defense capabilities and the format of our armed forces,
* the increased risks stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
* and, perhaps most importantly, the impact of the Helsinki decisions.
In fact, this is actually the first time that our defense planning will have to take into account the European dimension in such depth.
*
But our focus these days, as you have understood, is not only national. What we are trying to create is a European dynamic to enhance joint military capabilities. The progress and efforts that have been made in recent years by countries such as France, the United Kingdom and other allies such as the Netherlands are something that we would like to see in the whole European Union. During 40 years, we in Europe remained sheltered by American protection, for which we were, and are still, grateful. But the challenges of the post-Cold war era leave no room for complacency. It is high time for us Europeans to get our acts together.
Our efforts to give the European Union a capacity of autonomous action will not be detrimental to the solidity of the Alliance. We are not talking about a "zero-sum game" here. What we are talking about is what some in your country would call a "win-win" situation. A strong European political framework and impetus is critical to get things done within NATO. Indeed, the European effort and the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative are mutually reinforcing processes, which should and will be conducted in harmony and in transparency. And NATO will remain the cornerstone of our security for the defense of common objectives, centered on, but not limited to, collective defense.
The US has reasons to rejoice when the Europeans show growing willingness to take a fair share of the burden of collective responsibilities and make a more important contribution to common operations. This is good for a healthier, sounder, revitalized transatlantic relationship.
In this respect, I would like to say one word about NMD, summing up our position before exploring this topic more in depth with you during the Q As, if you wish:
1. American projects create concerns in Europe. To quote but a few, speaking for France: we fear that NMD could fuel a new arms race, and more generally could serve as a convenient cover by those States that do not want to be strictly bound by non-proliferation norms, especially after the CTBT rejection by the Senate. We also are concerned by US-Russian cooperation on anti-missile defense systems (as a price you will pay for Russian agreement to revise of the ABM Treaty), which could not leave Europeans indifferent.
2. We want to have a responsible and constructive approach to this problem:
- because this is a debate that concerns all of us. Ballistic proliferation is a concern for us as it is for you, even though the domestic debate here is far more intense on this issue and even if we do not draw the same conclusions from similar threat analyses.
- in a cooperative manner with you. Even though no NMD system has yet been fielded, and despite the technical uncertainties that surround NMD today, the NMD program already has consequences for U.S. allies, as well as for the international community. Even if you wanted to, you would not be able to take this decision in a vacuum. President Clinton has indicated that, among the factors he will take into account when he makes his decision later this year, there would be the international implications of NMD. It is up to us therefore to work with you in giving you our vision of them.
3. What does this mean ? In other words, what is it we want ? In a nutshell :
- to have a real, in-depth political and technical discussion among key allies, on the motivations behind NMD and the consequences for common security and nuclear deterrence within the Alliance;
- to see the U.S. commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation strongly reaffirmed. This implies several things, including that the U.S. should commit itself to not deploying an NMD system in the absence of a satisfactory outcome to the ongoing consultation process with Russia.
Once again, our objective is that of a healthier, sounder, revitalized transatlantic relationship. In order to meet this objective, we must, on both sides of the Atlantic, be willing to make the necessary adjustments. I believe the price is well worth it.
Thank you for your attention./.
(Source http://www.defense.gouv.fr, le 2 mars 2000)
It is a pleasure to take the floor in front of such a distinguished panel of defense and European security experts.
Let me begin with a few words on the Kosovo crisis. This was a defining moment for the Balkans, for European security, and for the Atlantic Alliance. We were able, once again, to demonstrate that we were prepared to act together for the defense of common interests and common values. The partnership that we forged earlier in this century to fight against barbarity was confirmed and renewed through this trial. The tragedy of the Southern Balkans, and the immense human suffering in this region, was, and still is, a reminder of the goals that we share. It helps us to keep in perspective the more bureaucratic aspects of defense policies and our secondary occasional disagreements. We sometimes differ on strategies and methods - not on goals and values.
I will not dwell on the " good news, bad news " list of lessons learned for the Alliance, as I imagine that you are all too familiar with it by now. Let me simply say once again that however demanding this crisis was for the Alliance, we were able to maintain a high degree of unity and cohesion in defending our common interests. I would like to commend here, once again, the direct military involvement of the US and of our allies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain or the Netherlands, but also the courageous and firm commitment of countries closer to the theater of operations, such as Italy, Greece or Hungary. These are very positive developments both for the future of the Alliance and for the future of European defense.
The management of the Kosovo crisis was also a rewarding example of cooperation and synergies between various fora and institutions: it was only natural for this common military operation to be undertaken in a NATO framework; but the political management was achieved by the Group of Contact, the European Union, the G8 and the ultimate legitimacy conferred by the United Nations.
For France, there were reasons to be satisfied. Our involvement validated the principles of our new defense model: total professionalization, emphasis on intelligence, command and control, and projection capacities.
Our current shortcomings were verified: suppression of enemy air defenses, all-weather precision strike, airlift, battlefield damage assessment; our defense planning already takes into account most of these (for example, cruise missiles are already included in our procurement plan).
French participation in Allied Force was, as you know, quite significant. No other country, apart from the United States, was able to deploy so wide a range of Air Force, Navy and Army military means, notably in areas where few NATO members have any useful capacities, such as intelligence-gathering tools or Search Rescue capabilities. France deployed 68 combat aircraft (7% of the coalition total), including 51 strike aircraft (8.8%). The total number of sorties of French aircraft put us second only to the United States, and makes our air contribution by and large the first European one. In particular, French aircraft flew 16.6% of all close air support sorties, 13.8% of all reconnaissance sorties, 11.2% of all electronic intelligence sorties. France was the only European country to deploy a conventional aircraft carrier on the theater. Our commitment to the NATO management of the Kosovo crisis also included significant ground forces, from XFOR (headed by a French officer) to KFOR.
I understand that several of the lessons we have drawn from the Kosovo crisis are shared by many in the United States. In particular, the importance of the communication dimension was underestimated by many of us. NATO was not prepared enough for this.
I should also emphasize that many of the "lessons" cannot yet be "learned ". Forgive me for stating the obvious: this is an ongoing operation, of which we have " won " - for whatever that means - the first" round ". But we have yet to " win " the second round. We have yet to win the peace. UNMIK and KFOR, a NATO force that includes mostly (80%) European personnel and which will soon be commanded by a European military structure, will need our full political support in the months to come.
We will have other crises to manage together, other common operations to conduct. We will sometimes have disagreements. Major peace enforcement operations are among the most difficult ones to manage. During the Kosovo crisis, all of our governments had to face domestic political pressures, in one way or another. We had to work hard to reach consensus in the North Atlantic Council. But a tight political control by all NATO allies is necessary when the use of force is about imposing military pressure and not about waging total war.
*
The European military effort is frequently misunderstood in this country. Let me try to set the record straight.
a. The "deployability gap"
It is true that even the ratio between the total number of military personnel in Europe and the total number of deployable forces for a crisis management operation is not satisfying. This is one of the reasons behind our common effort launched at Helsinki. But one should be cautious about crude comparisons:
* Geography makes a difference. US forces are bound to have a very high level of deployability because they are far away from most of their possible theaters. Europe is planning to act mainly in its surroundings.
* Engagements matter too. The US is a global power with global military engagements. Europe has global economic and political responsibilities, but does not claim to have the same scope and level of military engagements around the world.
* The Cold war has ended but NATO has not forfeited the need for collective defense. Some European countries believe that they should maintain significant main defense forces for possible regional operations in their near neighborhood.
* Some progress in deployability has already been achieved since the end of the Cold War. A September 1999 study of European armed forces by the US General Accounting Office, mandated by the US Congress, found that " NATO allies have become more mobile and deployable as envisioned by the [Rome 1991] Strategic Concept (...). Each of the 13 allied countries we studied have achieved greater mobility and deployability ". France is of course in its way to be highly deployable by 2002, when our overall reorganization will be over.
b) The " spending gap "
* The US effort is now on the rise, but this is happening after 10 years of sharp decline and eight years of sustained economic growth. As you know, the US budget [in $1997] was 400 billion $ in 1985 and was reduced to 250 billion dollars in 1997. The US defense investment account (R D plus procurement) has fallen by 60% since 1990. It was [in $1997] about 120 billion dollars in 1985, and is now about 50 billion dollars.
* The European effort is insufficient, but the gap between European spending and US spending is actually decreasing, not increasing: the combined spending of the 11 EU and NATO members was 58% of that of the US in 1992; it is now 65% by NATO data. This reveals the fact that the European defense budgets have been more efficiently sheltered from the so-called " peace dividends effect " than the US one. And Europe is now entering a durable growth period, which should, as has been the case in the US, sustain a resumption of defense expenditure.
c) The " technological gap "
* Technology is not the only measure of an effective defense effort. There is often, in this country, what some here could call a "technology-biased " approach of defense. But human capabilities are also critical. In peace operations, in particular, human abilities and know-how are as important, if not more, than, technologies.
* The exceptional economic and technological dynamism of the United States, allows it to develop, introduce and deploy, faster than any other country, high-tech military means. This makes the definition and implementation of NATO standards and of interoperability norms by all 19 nations sometimes difficult.
* The reality of the gap should not be exaggerated. We often confuse, the increasing gap between the civilian technologies and the military technologies in all our countries; and the gap between actual military equipment in Europe and in the US, which is more limited.
* In many respects, we can live with it. There was no critical interoperability deficiency in Operation Allied Force, even if the situation in the field of communications was not satisfactory.
* Indeed, despite our shortcomings, the gap often concerns capacities more than technologies. Europe critically lacks modern and robust intelligence capacities, for instance, including space-based ones. It also lacks heavy lift capacities, which are not at the frontier of technological conquest.
* Examples in the civilian sector (aerospace, communications) show us that Europe is not always lagging behind - and that, when it does, it is able to " catch up ". Indeed, Airbus and Arianespace have strong transatlantic ties at a cutting-edge level of technology.
So we need to spend no less, and perhaps more, especially on R D at the European level. But we mostly need to spend better. We want to have better value for our money - " more defense for our Euros ".
*
The fragmentation of the European defense effort has long been a source of frustration on both sides of the Atlantic, both on the industrial and on the policy side. It is our belief that the best approach to overcome this starts with consolidation among Europeans, to have more effective transatlantic cooperation.
Indeed, there is now progress being made.
* In the industrial domain, restructurings and mergers are now well underway. New, unified regulatory frameworks that allow for increased international cooperation are also needed. The " Letter of Intent " (LoI) framework, which involves the six EU members where 90% of the defense industry of the Union is located, is a first step in this direction; it is now finalized and should be signed shortly. It will allow for transparency of borders and increased industrial efficiency (sensitive information transfers, export controls, and security of acquisitions). It will then be possible to move ahead as far as transatlantic cooperation is concerned. Further efforts will be necessary on both sides of the Atlantic to reach consensus on the real equality of access through both markets. We welcome, in this respect, the recent US/UK Declaration on industrial cooperation, which is consistent and compatible with this European effort.
* The remarkable acceleration of the progress in the defense dimension of " Project Europe " has been brought by a combination of several factors. The preservation and the solidity of our common Alliance is he first of them: NATO continues to be the bedrock of security on the Euro-Atlantic region. The achievement of European Monetary Union, something that many in this town were very skeptical about only two years ago was another one, which showed a successful challenge and allowed us to transfer some of our energies to a new field. The fact that all of our key European partners now fully concur with the idea of giving the EU a defense dimension was also critical. And finally, the Kosovo crisis, that acted both as a wake-up call and as a booster.
Helsinki will allow for military operations in situations where, for a reason or another, the US is not willing to use force on its own. Our common language reads as follows: " the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capability to take decisions, and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then conduct EU-led military operations in response to an international crisis ".
This does not imply a relaxation of transatlantic links. Quite the contrary. As my German colleague Rudolf Scharping recently said at the Wehrkunde conference: "Generating a European security and defense identity by strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, and developing the political and structural prerequisites for a European security and defense policy as part of European integration, are two sides of the same coin".
In addition, the " institutions " that we are creating will be of a reasonable size when compared with their NATO equivalents: the European Military Staff will comprise between 60 and 90 officers, and will thus be roughly five times smaller than NATO's International Military Staff [383].
By 2003, we should be able to deploy in 60 days a corps-size ground force of up to 15 brigades (a total of 50-60,000 men) and sustain it over a year, with autonomous C3I and logistics. Helsinki also requires collective capabilities in the fields of strategic assessment, command and control, and strategic transport. A major effort at " pooling " some of our national capabilities is thus going to be necessary in the months and years to come. Such a capability may appear to you as a modest step: but its scope is adapted to most of the needs of crisis mastering by European forces. Command structures at the strategic level, and operational planning capabilities, will draw both on national and NATO assets. Focusing on this practical achievements is for us a realistic way of supporting our Alliance as well as of developing the European ability to pacify its environment.
*
Some of you here are familiar with the French defense planning process. You know that the current Six-Year Defense Plan adopted by our Parliament in 1996 - what we call the Military Program Law - is the decisive one on the road towards our new Defense Model.
Having just passed the first half of this plan we can see the benefits of the major restructuring efforts that have been undertaken since 1991. As you know, we had serious shortcomings at the time of the Gulf War. Our projection capacity for crisis management was very limited and we had to "improvise" a lot. Now our projection capacity is of about 15.000 Army personnel for a deployment of unlimited duration, and of about 30.000 Army personnel for a year in extreme circumstances where all of our available capacities would be needed.
The next Military Program Law will bring these totals closer to the goals of the Defense Model: 50.000 Army personnel for NATO regional defense, or, simultaneously (for two concurrent deployments), 30.000 during one year for a major regional contingency, and 5.000 for a long-term deployment elsewhere. For their part, our Navy and Air Force are already, for all practical purposes, at the levels required by the Defense Model: a hundred combat aircraft with air refueling capacities and deployable air bases for the Air Force, a carrier battle group, nuclear attack submarines and amphibious forces for the Navy.
We have confirmed our intention to keep a high level of annual military spending. This effort amounts to about 30 billion euros a year (equivalent to 30 billion dollars), and has been constant since 1997.
I should add that the French defense effort has historically been one of the most consistent and coherent of all NATO countries:
* Our defense spending has not varied a lot over the years. It was [in converted FRF 1990] :
30.4 billion euros in 1980
33.8 billion euros in 1985
35.5 billion euros in 1990
32.9 billion euros in 1995
32.3 billion euros in 1999
By comparison, the US spending has been something of a roller-coaster:
224 billion dollars in 1980
301 billion dollars in 1985
306 billion dollars in 1990
240 billion dollars in 1995
225 billion dollars in 1999
* Our defense budget represented 11.4% of the US one in 1990, 13.3% in 1999. [Our equipment budget has been reduced; but the US one has been reduced much more.]
* We also maintain the highest defense spending to GDP ratio in NATO Europe (with the exception of Greece and Turkey, which are in a different situation): 2.8% in 1999, a figure that does not compare too badly to the US ratio (3.1%). I note that this ratio has diminished much more in the US than it has in France since the end of the Cold war [Fr : from 3.8% to 2.8% ; US : from 6% to about 3%].
* Our defense expenditure per capita ranks second in Europe [behind Norway]: 654 $ per capita.
I listen and read about US defense policy and I notice that the military establishments of our two countries face some analogue challenges :
* adjusting major equipment programs that were conceived or launched at the end of the Cold War ;
* facing multiple and concurrent military engagements, which stretch our armed forces to the limits of their possibilities and sometimes drain our planned procurement resources [a total of 37.600 French military personnel are currently deployed outside French metropolitan territory, including about 10.000 in ongoing military operations]
* stopping the decrease in national R D efforts [The Aerospace Industries Association says that the adjusted DoD RDT E effort in 2001 will be the lowest in 18 years].
The Prime minister has announced last fall that the Government will submit to Parliament the next Military Program Law in 2001. My office and the services have begun the preparatory work that will lead to the elaboration of this draft law. Some of the key issues that need to be addressed in this effort include:
* an adequate introduction of available technologies bringing greater efficiency and lowering costs,
* the lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis,
* the weight of long-term deployments on our defense capabilities and the format of our armed forces,
* the increased risks stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
* and, perhaps most importantly, the impact of the Helsinki decisions.
In fact, this is actually the first time that our defense planning will have to take into account the European dimension in such depth.
*
But our focus these days, as you have understood, is not only national. What we are trying to create is a European dynamic to enhance joint military capabilities. The progress and efforts that have been made in recent years by countries such as France, the United Kingdom and other allies such as the Netherlands are something that we would like to see in the whole European Union. During 40 years, we in Europe remained sheltered by American protection, for which we were, and are still, grateful. But the challenges of the post-Cold war era leave no room for complacency. It is high time for us Europeans to get our acts together.
Our efforts to give the European Union a capacity of autonomous action will not be detrimental to the solidity of the Alliance. We are not talking about a "zero-sum game" here. What we are talking about is what some in your country would call a "win-win" situation. A strong European political framework and impetus is critical to get things done within NATO. Indeed, the European effort and the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative are mutually reinforcing processes, which should and will be conducted in harmony and in transparency. And NATO will remain the cornerstone of our security for the defense of common objectives, centered on, but not limited to, collective defense.
The US has reasons to rejoice when the Europeans show growing willingness to take a fair share of the burden of collective responsibilities and make a more important contribution to common operations. This is good for a healthier, sounder, revitalized transatlantic relationship.
In this respect, I would like to say one word about NMD, summing up our position before exploring this topic more in depth with you during the Q As, if you wish:
1. American projects create concerns in Europe. To quote but a few, speaking for France: we fear that NMD could fuel a new arms race, and more generally could serve as a convenient cover by those States that do not want to be strictly bound by non-proliferation norms, especially after the CTBT rejection by the Senate. We also are concerned by US-Russian cooperation on anti-missile defense systems (as a price you will pay for Russian agreement to revise of the ABM Treaty), which could not leave Europeans indifferent.
2. We want to have a responsible and constructive approach to this problem:
- because this is a debate that concerns all of us. Ballistic proliferation is a concern for us as it is for you, even though the domestic debate here is far more intense on this issue and even if we do not draw the same conclusions from similar threat analyses.
- in a cooperative manner with you. Even though no NMD system has yet been fielded, and despite the technical uncertainties that surround NMD today, the NMD program already has consequences for U.S. allies, as well as for the international community. Even if you wanted to, you would not be able to take this decision in a vacuum. President Clinton has indicated that, among the factors he will take into account when he makes his decision later this year, there would be the international implications of NMD. It is up to us therefore to work with you in giving you our vision of them.
3. What does this mean ? In other words, what is it we want ? In a nutshell :
- to have a real, in-depth political and technical discussion among key allies, on the motivations behind NMD and the consequences for common security and nuclear deterrence within the Alliance;
- to see the U.S. commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation strongly reaffirmed. This implies several things, including that the U.S. should commit itself to not deploying an NMD system in the absence of a satisfactory outcome to the ongoing consultation process with Russia.
Once again, our objective is that of a healthier, sounder, revitalized transatlantic relationship. In order to meet this objective, we must, on both sides of the Atlantic, be willing to make the necessary adjustments. I believe the price is well worth it.
Thank you for your attention./.
(Source http://www.defense.gouv.fr, le 2 mars 2000)